The politics behind the implementation of the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision in Canada to increase global drug access by Esmail, Laura C & Kohler, Jillian Clare
RESEARCH Open Access
The politics behind the implementation of the
WTO Paragraph 6 Decision in Canada to increase
global drug access
Laura C Esmail
* and Jillian Clare Kohler
Abstract
Background: The reform of pharmaceutical policy can often involve trade-offs between competing social and
commercial goals. Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR), a legislative amendment that permits compulsory
licensing for the production and export of medicines to developing countries, aimed to reconcile these goals.
Since it was passed in 2004, only two orders of antiretroviral drugs, enough for 21,000 HIV/AIDS patients in Rwanda
have been exported. Future use of the regime appears unlikely. This research aimed to examine the politics of
CAMR.
Methods: Parliamentary Committee hearing transcripts from CAMR’s legislative development (2004) and legislative
review (2007) were analysed using a content analysis technique to identify how stakeholders who participated in
the debates framed the issues. These findings were subsequently analysed using a framework of framing,
institutions and interests to determine how these three dimensions shaped CAMR.
Results: In 2004, policy debates in Canada were dominated by two themes: intellectual property rights and the
TRIPS Agreement. The right to medicines as a basic human right and CAMR’s potential impact on innovation were
hardly discussed. With the Departments of Industry Canada and International Trade as the lead institutions, the
goals of protecting intellectual property and ensuring good trade relations with the United States appear to have
taken priority over encouraging generic competition to achieve drug affordability. The result was a more limited
interpretation of patent flexibilities under the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision. The most striking finding is the minimal
discussion over the potential barriers developing country beneficiaries might face when attempting to use
compulsory licensing, including their reluctance to use TRIPS flexibilities, their desire to pursue technological
development and the constraints inherent in the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision. Instead, these issues were raised in
2007, which can be partly accounted for by experience in implementing the legislation and hence a greater
representation of the interests of potential beneficiary country governments.
Conclusions: The Canadian Government designed CAMR as a last resort measure. Increased input from the
developing country beneficiaries and shifting to institutions where the right to health gets prioritized may lead to
policies that better achieves affordable drug access.
Keywords: Access to medicines, Drug access, Pharmaceuticals, HIV/AIDS, Intellectual property rights, Patents, Com-
pulsory licensing, TRIPS, Paragraph 6, Human rights, Canada’s access to medicines regime
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Global inequity in access to medicines continues to per-
sist despite an increase in international efforts to address
this problem over the last decade. The WHO estimates
that approximately two billion people still lack regular
access to essential medicines, which can be defined as the
“equitable availability and affordability of essential medi-
cines” [1-3]. For example, approximately 9.8 million of an
estimated 15 million people living with HIV/AIDS in low
and middle-income countries remain without access to
antiretroviral therapy [4]. The emergence of new global
actors such as the Gates Foundation and the Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria has helped but
not enough.
a The inequity in drug access extends to
chronic diseases as well, with one study finding access
levels of 7.5% to medicines for the treatment of cardio-
vascular disease, diabetes, chronic respiratory disease,
glaucoma and palliative cancer care in six low- and mid-
dle-income countries [5].
There are many factors that contribute to these drug
access inequities. The cost of drugs is a major obstacle,
due to either the poverty of individuals and governments
or high prices on the supply side [2]. Health systems
infrastructure and its capacity to serve its population is a
major obstacle, with inadequate facilities and lack of
trained health professionals making it difficult to treat
patients. Corruption in the pharmaceutical sector is a
problem as well diverting scarce resources away from
health systems [6]. Inappropriate drug use is a problem,
which includes inappropriate prescribing by health pro-
fessionals, inappropriate medicine use, and poor compli-
ance by the end user [2]. These are only some of the
barriers to drug access and as such, it is not a ‘single fail-
ure’ problem [2]. The lack of drug access is often the
result of a combination of failures in the market, in gov-
ernment and even among aid players.
Crafting policy in this area is challenging precisely
because drug access is a multi-faceted and complex issue.
Just as there are many ways to think about and define
drug access, there are many ways to address the problem
of getting the right drug to the right person at the right
time, and from a political perspective, every solution
favours some groups more than others. With vested inter-
ests at stake, how drug access and its potential solutions
are framed is a highly charged political exercise.
This paper examines the influence of framing, institu-
tions and interests on the development of a compulsory
licensing policy, which aims to increase access to medi-
cines in developing countries. The case study under exam-
ination is Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR)
originally known as the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa,
which implements the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision [7]. To
date, CAMR is the only example of the use of the WTO
Paragraph 6 Decision internationally. In theory, CAMR
allows Canadian generic manufacturers to produce
patented medicines under a government-issued compul-
sory license for export to developing countries; [8] how-
ever, the bill is considered by many as an inadequate
method to encourage improved drug access [9-11]. Since
it was passed in 2004, it took three years for a group of
civil society advocates and one Canadian generic company,
Apotex, to produce and export a limited drug supply
under CAMR. These efforts resulted in one order of anti-
retroviral tablets, enough to treat 21,000 HIV/AIDS
patients in Rwanda for one year [11]
b. Since then, repre-
sentatives of developing countries and generic manufac-
turers have stated that the regime is too cumbersome and
difficult to use and will unlikely use it again unless it is
reformed [11].
Research objectives
This research aims to examine the politics underpinning
CAMR, by evaluating how stakeholders framed access to
medicines and how framing, institutions and interests
interacted and influenced CAMR.
Theoretical framework
To answer these questions, a conceptual framework of
framing, interests and institutions was used. Frames are
defined as “a policy position resting on underlying struc-
tures of belief, perception and appreciation” [12]. In con-
junction with framing theory, this research uses Stone’s
four-value framework to analyse actors’ discourse during
the policy debates, which posits that political struggles
typically revolve around four main abstract policy goals:
equity, efficiency, security and liberty [13]
c. Interests are
defined as the preferences of actors, which depend upon
the potential effects of a policy [13]. Institutions are
defined as “recognized patterns of behaviour or practice
around which expectations converge” [14]. Institutions
refer to government structures and agencies, as well as
the formal and informal rules that exist internationally
and domestically. Related to institutions, but cutting
across the entire theoretical framework, is Scope of Con-
flict theory, which argues that institutions can affect how
a problem is defined in the first place, who gets involved
in a policy debate, and what arguments get more weight
than others [15].
In order to reach a solution, an issue must be defined to
some extent, a process called framing; however, every defi-
nition and simplification emphasizes some aspects of the
problem at the expense of others [12]. The analysis of sta-
keholder framing can expose what policy options were
ruled out from the beginning, what policy options were
actually considered, what issues or arguments stakeholders
and governments failed to consider in a policy debate, and
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t h ep o l i c yd e b a t e .
Moreover, different institutions value these frames and
interests differently and public policy literature suggests
institutions are a key determining factor in how the pro-
blem and the alternatives available are framed and which
ones matter more than others [13,15,16]. Institutional
structures and processes influence how a problem is
d e f i n e di nt h ef i r s tp l a c e ,w h i c hd e f i n e sw h a ti sa ts t a k e ,
the interested parties, and what ideas get privileged over
others. Altogether, institutions, framing, and interests
influence the trade-offs that participants in the policy
conflict will have to make, which ultimately restricts the
policy outcome.
TRIPS, the Doha Declaration and the Paragraph 6
Decision
The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement outlines the minimum stan-
dards of all WTO Member countries for the protection
of intellectual property rights [17]. In return, countries
could pursue their goals of a strong domestic economy
through access to global markets and increased technol-
ogy transfer to least-developed countries. These policy
goals took their roots in the principles of the efficiency of
free, unfettered markets. Pursuant to TRIPS, patent
holders are given a limited set of rights that includes
exclusive marketing rights for a set duration of time.
TRIPS obligations include 20 years of patent protection
from the inventor’s filing date (Article 33), patent rights
free of discrimination against the origin of invention or
production (Article 27.1), and exclusive marketing rights
for the entire patent duration (Article 28) [18].
TRIPS grants limited flexibility around patent rights to
Member countries to address public health needs.
d Arti-
c l e3 1 ,o t h e r w i s ek n o w na s“compulsory licensing”,p e r -
mits a government to issue a third-party license without
the patent-holders’ consent.
The premise underlying compulsory licensing is the
price advantage of generic competition.
e Médecins Sans
Frontières reports that the prices of antiretroviral ther-
apy in the developing world decreased to the lowest
unprecedented levels as a result of global generic com-
petition, particularly coming from Indian manufacturers
[19]
f. Furthermore, nothing restricts the application of
TRIPS Article 31 to chronic diseases [20].
The Doha Declaration, unanimously passed by WTO
members in November 2001, clearly states that “[t]he
TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent
Members from taking measures to protect public health...
we affirm that the Agreement can and should be inter-
preted and implemented in a manner supportive of
WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in
particular, to promote access to medicines for all” [21].
This suggests that countries should be able to make use
of compulsory licensing and other flexibilities as they see
fit. But, compulsory licensing is only worthwhile if manu-
facturing capabilities exist.
Two years later, the Paragraph 6 Decision was passed,
which allows countries with manufacturing capacity to
produce and export generic versions of patented medi-
cines under compulsory license to countries without
sufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity.
Canada’s policy legacy in pharmaceuticals and intellectual
property
Canada has a strong history of using compulsory licen-
sing towards the production and importation of pharma-
ceuticals. In 1969, the Liberal Government amended its
Patent Law to better facilitate compulsory licensing, after
a series of reports identified patent protection as one of
the major contributors to high drug costs in Canada [22]
g. Canada’s generic pharmaceutical manufacturing indus-
try grew as a result of widespread compulsory licensing
of pharmaceutical products [23]. From 1969 to 1992,
Canada issued 613 licenses import or manufacture medi-
cines under compulsory license [24]. The Government
did not believe Canada was losing economically from it,
and given Canada’s negligible role in pharmaceutical
innovation, the government did not see compulsory
licensing making any impact on the R&D budgets of the
innovative pharmaceutical industry. From the govern-
ment’s perspective, the policy decision traded away only
the profits of the patent-holding companies [25].
The story changed significantly in 1987, when Prime
Minister Brian Mulroney signed the Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA) with the United States [22]. Bill C-22, which
amended the Patent Act and extended patent protection
to 17 years in Canada, is viewed by some as linked to
Canada’s accession to the Free Trade Agreement with
the United States and heavy lobbying by the multina-
tional pharmaceutical industry [26]. The Mulroney gov-
ernment justified the change in patent law on the three
basic premises: it reconciled domestic regulation with
internationally mandated standards; it boosted R&D in
Canada; and it incorporated Canada as a contributor to
global pharmaceutical R&D [25]. From a domestic eco-
nomic standpoint, the government wanted to steer
Canada towards a more competitive, “knowledge-based
economy” and in return, it would receive access to more
open U.S. markets [25]. Bill C-91, introduced in 1993,
was required for Canada’s accession to the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World
Trade Organization (WTO) [25]. It effectively abolished
compulsory licensing from Canada’s mechanisms to con-
tain escalating drug costs. Overall, Canada’sp o l i c ys h i f t
in the area of pharmaceutical intellectual property pro-
tection took place in a context of a global movement
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tection and the promotion of the idea of building compe-
titive, knowledge-based economies.
Introduction of CAMR
Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR) imple-
ments the WTO Decision on the Implementation of the
Paragraph 6 Decision of the TRIPS Agreement into
Canadian domestic law [7]. It amended the Patent Act
and Food and Drugs Act to allow the limited use of
government-issued, third-party licensing in Canada for
humanitarian purposes. Specifically, it permits Canadian
generic drug manufacturers to produce a “lower-cost
version of a patented drug or medical device for export
to developing countries that do not have the capacity to
manufacture such products”[8].
After intense lobbying by Canadian civil society and a
call to the Canadian federal government by Stephen
Lewis, then UN Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa,
the Canadian Government under then Prime Minister
Jean Chrétien announced it would amend its Patent Act
and implement the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision and on
November 6, 2003, the Liberal government introduced
Bill C-56
h, An Act to Amend the Patent Act and the
Food and Drugs Act [27]
i.
How CAMR works
CAMR’s process and pitfalls are outlined in detail else-
where, but the following provides a brief overview
[28-30]. In order for a compulsory license to be issued,
and a drug shipment sent to a country, several prelimin-
ary steps and criteria must first be met: 1) the importing
country’s eligibility must first be confirmed, as to whether
it falls in one of three lists; 2) the medicine must first be
deemed eligible as indicated by a schedule; 3) the generic
company must first make efforts to obtain a voluntary
license from the patent holder, of which there can be
multiple; and 4) the generic company must first enter a
contract with an importing country, without holding the
license to produce the product. Through a procedure
under the Governor in Council, countries can request the
addition of a medicine or product. NGOs can use the
regime to distribute medicines to another country only if
they obtain an authorization from the importing country
government.
Upon receiving the compulsory license the pharmaceu-
tical company must meet all anti-diversion requirements,
determine the royalty payment due to the patent holder,
and establish a website with up-to-date details regarding
the shipment.
j A compulsory license is valid for two years
with a one-time two-year renewal if the specified quantity
has not yet been shipped. Patent-holders can challenge a
license if they believe it is being used for “commercial
purposes”
k or if diversion of the medicines occurs, which
then leads to the termination of the license
l.
Since the passage of the legislation, only Rwanda has
used the regime once to receive two shipments of anti-
retrovirals – enough for 21,000 HIV/AIDS patients in
Rwanda. This required enormous effort on the part of
an alliance of NGOs and a Canadian generic company-
Apotex. Since then, Apotex has publicly stated that it is
reluctant to participate in the initiative again unless
changes are made to streamline the regime [31].
The Liberal Government’s announcement of reintro-
ducing compulsory licensing to assist developing coun-
t r i e st o o km a n yb ys u r p r i s e .W h i l et h ep o l i c ym o v e
received some praise primarily in the domestic press,
once the policy details started to surface, both civil
society activists and the generic industry started to
doubt the Government’s intentions. What started as a
beacon of hope for the international community, soon
t u r n e do u tt ob eah i g h l yc o m p l e xp o l i c y-al a s tr e s o r t
measure. Despite attempts to review the policy and
amend it, the regime remains as it is today: a public pol-
icy failure.
Policy development and review process
The regime underwent two deliberative and develop-
mental processes from 2004 through 2007: 1) in 2004,
which sought public consultation with stakeholders to
help inform the development of the policy, and 2) in
2007, which sought public inp u tf r o ms t a k e h o l d e r st o
review the regime and potentially amend it. After this
consultation, the Canadian Government tabled its report
to Parliament and concluded that the case for making
legislative or regulatory changes to CAMR had not yet
been made [32].
Methods
This is a single case study, which used a comprehensive
sampling strategy within specifically designated data
boundaries. Data collection focused on two hearings of
the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Industry,
Science and Technology regarding CAMR. The first set
of hearings consulted stakeholders on CAMR’s draft leg-
islation known as Bill C-9, An Act to Amend the Patent
Act and Food and Drugs Act. These hearings took place
from February 24, 2004 to April 22, 2004. The second
set of hearings reviewed the implementation and out-
comes of CAMR from April 16, 2007 to April 23, 2007.
The hearings were open to the public and witnesses
were selected by the Parliamentary Standing Committee
based upon several criteria, including the type of study
and the amount of time available. These are publicly
available and well-defined data sources that informed
who took part in the hearings (actors) and what they
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tion and during the mandatory legislative review.
A content analysis was used to analyse the frames that
actors expressed through the government consultation
processes. This study adopted a mixed method approach
to the content analysis, which involved two distinct
stages and two distinct assumptions: first, a quantitative
content analysis was performed assuming positivist
approach;[33] second, the theme contents were summar-
ized assuming a critical realist approach [34]. First, quan-
titative content analysis was chosen because it allows for
a more explicit view of patterns that lead to the associa-
tions and conclusions. Counting the codes permitted the
comparison of who said what on a macro-level: the level
of emphasis that stakeholders placed on various issues
was one indicator of what their key interests were in this
policy debate. This quantitative content analysis pro-
duced categorized sections of text according to theme
and stakeholder. The textual contents of these categor-
ized sections were then summarized qualitatively. These
summaries provided context to the quantitative results,
which then provided a second level of detail on stake-
holder interests and more comprehensively answered the
question of how stakeholders framed access to medicines
in the case of CAMR. Furthermore, the political context
obtained through the qualitative summaries provided an
important backdrop by which to understand specifically
what factors ultimately shaped Canada’s implementation
of the Paragraph 6 Decision.
The creation and development of a codebook involved
the following steps: 1) consultation of the literature to
develop an initial list of themes and corresponding key-
words, 2) application of the initial codebook to samples
of data, 3) adjusting themes and keywords based upon
these initial results (to be described below), and then 4)
proceeding by coding the entire set of documents. To see
the codebook, please consult Additional file 1.
To ensure reliability two researchers coded sample
documents until an inter-rater reliability of 80% was
achieved. Eighty percent inter-rater reliability is deemed
acceptable when manually coding [33,35]. Subsequently,
one researcher (LE) coded the full set of documents
using text-analysis software, NVivo,
m and reviewed all
text coded to ensure consistency of coding. To ensure lit-
tle to no content was missed, all transcripts were
searched for keywords and phrases using the text query
function in NVivo, and then manually coded if deemed
relevant. The unit of analysis is a complete session of
hearings, which in the case of 2007, includes 3 hearings.
Results
In 2004, a range of witnesses testified before the Stand-
ing Committee, as shown in Table 1. The stakeholder
groups listed represent all of the witnesses who testified.
The criteria used to categorize witnesses into stake-
holder groups were group membership (for institutional
interest groups) or their historical affiliation with other
groups and their policy positions (for issue-oriented
interest groups). Government representatives fell into
three major categories: 1) the ruling government, which
includes cabinet members and civil servants and 2)
Members of Parliament (MPs) on the standing commit-
tee, which included 8 MPs representing the Liberal
party, 4 representing the Conservative Party of Canada
(CPC), 2 representing the Bloc Quebecois (BQ), and 1
representing the New Democratic Party (NDP), and a
Chair from the Liberal party.
n Civil society consisted
mostly of non-profit aid organizations and few aca-
demics who often advocate alongside these groups. The
research-based and generic pharmaceutical industries
consisted of representatives of their membership-based
groups and company executives.
o
In 2007, a smaller scope of actors testified before the
Standing Committee; however, a much larger scope of
actors, from international and domestic organizations,
submitted written consultations compared with the 2004
debates. The legislative review was well-publicized and
facilitated through a website where the government
posted a consultation paper listing specific questions
regarding the regime. Any public individual or group
was invited to make a written submission in response to
the consultation paper.
For the 2007 review, consultations were held over
three days between April 16, 2007 and April 23, 2007.
Civil servants from the Departments of Industry Canada,
Health Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade
and the Canadian International Development Agency
testified on April 16, 2007. Representatives from civil
society organizations testified on April 18, 2007 and
representatives from both generic and research-based
industries testified on April 23, 2007.
Tables 2 through 5 present the results describing fre-
quency with certain themes and issues were discussed in
both 2004 and 2007. This quantitative presentation pro-
vides an overview of the policy goals and themes that
drove the debate.
The frequency of themes in 2004 (Table 2) illustrate
that the debates were primarily focused on issues related
to liberty (47%) and equity (34%). More specifically,
Table 3 illustrates that the participants in the 2004
debates appeared to be mainly arguing over: 1) where to
draw the line with respect to protecting intellectual
property (31.8%); and, 2) how to interpret the various
clauses of the WTO TRIPS Agreement (18.5%). Partici-
pants’ focus on equity (34%) was mainly about: 1) what
the benefits of the regime should entail (List of Medi-
cines, 12.4%); 2) who would be eligible for these benefits
(10.6%); and, 3) the role of aid in increasing access to
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cussed related to efficiency( 2 3 % )a n ds e c u r i t y( 1 9 % ) .
More specifically, these under-represented issues
included market competition (5.1%), procurement prac-
tices and protocols (3.1%), litigation (2.5%), innovation
(2.0%), human rights (1.4%) and Canadian domestic eco-
nomic issues (0.1%). To the extent that these issues were
deemphasized, they were not what participants argued
about during the debates. Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the
breakdown of themes by stakeholder group and political
party for the 2004 and 2007 deliberations.
Overall, these statistics back up the three main findings
outlined in this paper. First, the combination of partici-
pants’ focus on intellectual property and TRIPS along with
the institutional context in which this debate took place
led the discourse in a certain direction. By framing the
initiative as the implementation of the Paragraph 6 Deci-
sion, the Liberal government immediately channelled the
debate into the domestic institutions that had authority
over pharmaceutical patent law, along with their policy
legacy, preferences, norms, and rules. Since the venue lar-
gely dictates how an issue will be framed and can influence
how actors perceive and articulate their interests, intellec-
tual property and the WTO TRIPS Agreement became
the terms of debate for most stakeholders [16,36]. Given
that the goal of protecting intellectual property, as pro-
moted by the research-based industry, was entrenched in
the bureaucracy, Canada’s economic structure, interna-
tional trade rules and electoral considerations of the most
politicians on the Standing Committee (except for the
NDP), these goals ended up taking priority over most
other considerations, including the goals of drug
affordability (8.3%) through market competition (5.1%).
These institutional factors appeared to have the largest
impact on what the final design of CAMR would look like.
Second, the goals or issues that received less attention
during these debates were later identified in 2007 as
major barriers to the use of the legislation by civil society
and the generic industry.
p These include CAMR’s lack of
congruence with developing country procurement prac-
tices (3.1%), the threat of litigation against participating
Table 1 Standing committee witnesses in 2004 and 2007
Members of Parliament
Government
Officials
Research-
Based
Industry
Generic
Industry
Civil
Society
Intellectual
Property Institute
of Canada
Bloc
Quebecois
Conservatives Liberals New
Democrats
Independent
2004 7 2 2 18 2 2 4 9 1 0
2007 5 3 2 5 0 2 4 4 1 0
Table 2 Proportion of debates coded by policy goal
1, 2, 3
Equity Security Liberty Efficiency
n%n%n%n%
2004 37187 34 20642 19 51497 47 24921 23
2007 15964 29 15213 27 20777 37 19421 35
1 For 2004 debates, the denominator = 108536 words (i.e. total number of
words in ALL 2004 debates)
2 For 2007 debates, the denominator = 55530 words (i.e. total number of
words in ALL 2007 debates)
3 These percentages aggregate all stakeholders and political parties.
Percentages represent proportion of text where specified themes were found.
Paragraphs often made reference to more than one concept; therefore
paragraphs were often coded for multiple themes.
Table 3 2004 versus 2007 frequency of themes
2004 2007
Liberty
Intellectual Property 31.8% 27.8%
WTO or TRIPS 18.5% 14.5%
Right of Refusal 10.7% 0.0%
Developing Country Pressure 0.5% 2.0%
Equity
List of Medicines 12.4% 5.0%
Aid 11.5% 23.1%
List of Countries 10.6% 1.7%
Equal Opportunity to Supply 2.1% 0.3%
Efficiency
Diversion 6.1% 2.5%
Market Competition 5.1% 3.1%
Profit and ROI 4.5% 3.6%
Eligible Importers 4.3% 0.3%
Procurement 3.1% 5.3%
Litigation 2.5% 2.1%
CAMR Outcomes and uptake 0.0% 21.0%
Security
Affordability 8.3% 12.1%
Development 7.5% 11.9%
Quality and Safety 2.3% 3.5%
Innovation 2.0% 1.6%
Human Rights 1.4% 0.4%
Domestic Economy 0.1% 0.6%
Neglected Diseases 0.3% 0.3%
1 In 2004, the denominator = 108536 words (i.e. total number of words in ALL
2004 debates)
2 These percentages aggregate all stakeholders and political parties.
Percentages represent proportion of text where specified themes were found.
Paragraphs often made reference to more than one concept; therefore
paragraphs were often coded for multiple themes.
3 In 2007, the denominator = 55530 words (i.e. total number of words in ALL
2007 debates)
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sure placed on developing countries by more powerful
countries to avoid using TRIPS flexibilities altogether
(developing country pressure, 0.5%).
Finally, issues that were hardly discussed included:
innovation (2.0%), human rights (1.4%) and the Cana-
dian domestic economy (0.1%). As this paper argues, the
initial problem definition played a role in deemphasizing
these issues; however, the receptivity of the leading insti-
tutions to these frames also affected the scope of issues
up for debate. In particular, three relationships were lar-
gely overlooked during these debates: 1) the relationship
between intellectual property protection, TRIPS and
innovation; 2) the impact of CAMR on the Canadian
domestic economy; and, 3) the relationship of human
rights in relation to drug access, patents and TRIPS. For
example, the virtually negligible role that human rights
played throughout these hearings, points to the lack of
receptivity of the policy venue to that policy goal.
As seen in Table 2, the largest increase observed in
themes moving from 2004 to 2007 is in the frequency of
efficiency goals (an increase of 12% in the proportion of
text coded as efficiency). This represents the amount of
time spent discussing CAMR’s outcomes, implementa-
tion and uptake by developing countries and the Cana-
dian generic industry (Tables 4 and 5). This is not
surprising as the debates themselves were framed speci-
fically for this purpose: to review the legislation, three
years on, to assess whether any amendments had to be
made to the regime.
Table 4 Proportion of debates coded by theme by stakeholder
1, 2, 3
2004 2007
Research
Industry
Generic
Industry
Civil
Society
Government IPIC Research
Industry
Generic
Industry
Civil
Society
Government
(n = 3622) (n = 2938) (n =
31610)
(n = 19956) (n =
3327)
(n = 8785) (n = 4146) (n =
14327)
(n = 11330)
Equity
Aid 41% 25% 17% 13% 0% 29% 12% 25% 29%
List of Countries 1% 0% 7% 11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6%
List of Medicines 0% 4% 12% 18% 0% 3% 2% 8% 3%
Equal Opportunity to
supply
22% 1% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0%
Security
Drug Affordability 12% 19% 15% 2% 19% 17% 21% 17% 7%
Development 8% 0% 17% 5% 0% 19% 2% 11% 12%
Domestic Economy 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 1% 4% 0% 0%
Human Rights 0% 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1%
Innovation 2% 1% 2% 4% 0% 2% 5% 2% 1%
Quality and Safety 3% 9% 1% 5% 4% 2% 4% 3% 10%
Neglected Diseases 0% 0% 1% 0%
Liberty
Intellectual Property 23% 44% 25% 41% 63% 34% 43% 23% 37%
Developing Country
Pressure
0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 4% 5% 0%
Right of Refusal 10% 8% 16% 7% 18% 0% 0% 0% 0%
WTO or TRIPS 21% 13% 27% 22% 11% 12% 7% 23% 21%
Efficiency
Diversion 13% 0% 2% 10% 9% 5% 3% 2% 2%
Litigation 0% 0% 0% 7% 6% 0% 1% 4% 3%
Market Competition 4% 13% 11% 1% 11% 1% 11% 4% 1%
Procurement 15% 6% 4% 2% 5% 5% 3% 10% 3%
Profit and ROI 3% 7% 4% 6% 4% 4% 6% 3% 3%
Eligible Importers 0% 14% 6% 3% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0%
CAMR Outcomes and
Uptake
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 18% 13% 14% 24%
1 n = total number of words per testimony of stakeholder group. Unit of analysis = stakeholder-testimony.
2 Percentages represent proportion of text where specified themes were found. Paragraphs often made reference to more than one concept; therefore
paragraphs were often coded for multiple themes.
3 IPIC stands for the Intellectual Property Institute of Canada.
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to liberty goals (decrease of 10%). This observation can
be explained by the focus of most participants in 2004
on the right of refusal (10.7%), which was no longer an
issue in 2007 (0%). Instead, there was a greater emphasis
by participants in exploring other ways to improve drug
affordability (increase in 3.8%), especially through aid
programs (increase in 11.6%). The emphasis on aid
likely signals a shift towards pursuing voluntary policy
tools, such as corporate philanthropy and voluntary
price reductions, and a movement away from compul-
sory licensing to pursue affordable drug access.
Discussion
Through a systematic analysis of the framing of policy
debates, stakeholder interests and the relevant institutions,
this analysis aimed to determine how stakeholders framed
access to medicines in the case of CAMR and how fram-
ing, institutions and interests led to the policy product
known today as Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime. In
2004, policy debates were dominated by two themes over-
all: intellectual property rights and TRIPS compliance.
Promoting the right to health through access to essential
medicines and the impact of CAMR on innovation was
hardly discussed. With the Departments of Industry
Canada and International Trade as the lead institutions,
the goals of protecting intellectual property and ensuring
good trade relations with the United States appear to have
taken priority over encouraging generic competition to
achieve drug affordability. The result was a more limited
interpretation of patent flexibilities under the WTO Para-
graph 6 Decision. Perhaps the most striking finding is the
minimal discussion over the potential barriers developing
country beneficiaries might face when attempting to use
Table 5 Proportion of debates coded by theme by political party (MPs) 1,2
2004 2007
Liberals Conservatives Bloc
Quebecois
NDP Liberals Conservatives Bloc
Quebecois
NDP Independent
(n =
25593)
(n = 7864) (n = 5467) (n =
8159)
(n =
5474)
(n = 4935) (n = 2013) (n =
3168)
(n = 1352)
Equity
Aid 3% 8% 6% 6% 33% 11% 22% 2% 9%
List of Countries 18% 14% 10% 11% 1% 2% 0% 3% 0%
List of Medicines 12% 14% 8% 16% 0% 7% 19% 4% 0%
Equal Opportunity to
supply
2% 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Security
Drug Affordability 6% 1% 0% 7% 11% 2% 10% 6% 0%
Development 2% 5% 4% 4% 6% 9% 24% 7% 24%
Domestic Economy 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0%
Human Rights 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Innovation 2% 3% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 4%
Quality and Safety 1% 1% 0% 2% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0%
Liberty
Intellectual Property 36% 22% 20% 25% 17% 29% 20% 11% 7%
Developing Country
Pressure
0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 4% 0%
Right of Refusal 10% 9% 2% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
WTO or TRIPS 15% 5% 8% 10% 11% 2% 6% 4% 20%
Efficiency
Diversion 7% 5% 14% 1% 1% 0% 10% 0% 14%
Litigation 1% 4% 7% 2% 1% 3% 0% 0% 0%
Market Competition 4% 0% 0% 0% 3% 5% 0% 0% 0%
Procurement 1% 3% 1% 4% 8% 0% 5% 0% 3%
Profit and ROI 7% 0% 0% 3% 5% 6% 2% 4% 0%
Eligible Importers 3% 4% 11% 3% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0%
CAMR Outcomes and
Uptake
0% 0% 0% 0% 21% 16% 33% 49% 41%
1 n = total number of words per testimony of stakeholder group. Unit of analysis = stakeholder-testimony.
2 Percentages represent proportion of text where specified themes were found. Paragraphs often made reference to more than one concept; therefore
paragraphs were often coded for multiple themes.
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TRIPS flexibilities, constraints inherent in the WTO Para-
graph 6 Decision and reconciling many developing coun-
tries’ desire to pursue technological development. Instead,
these issues were raised in 2007, which can be partly
accounted for by a greater representation of the interests
of some developing country governments.
The 2004 content analysis results confirm the findings
in similar studies looking at TRIPS-related policy debates
over access to medicines, to show that intellectual prop-
erty issues dominated the policy contents [37-39]. In par-
ticular, the focus on protecting intellectual property,
complying with the TRIPS Agreement and the right of
refusal clause effectively displaced the deliberation of
other equally valid policy goals as well as upstream policy
implementation issues. Further confirming findings from
prior literature, the underlying interests within this
debate appeared to be divided into two positions: those
who advocated a more limited use of compulsory licen-
sing and those who wanted a broader, more flexible
regime. Not surprisingly, the research-based industry,
backed by the Intellectual Property Institute of Canada,
was in the former and civil society was in the latter.
Meanwhile, the generic industry appeared to hold a
mixed position throughout the debates. In 2004, they
seemed like reluctant participants, given the lack of com-
mercial incentive permitted by the Paragraph 6 Decision.
After Apotex got involved in CAMR’s implementation,
the generic industry may have had more vested interests
in the outcome of the 2007 debates, and held a position
in line with civil society, advocating for a streamlined and
easy-to-use compulsory licensing regime.
Overall, the 2004 Canadian debates occurred within a
limited policy space to start with. By framing the problem
as the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision, the Liberal Govern-
ment already influenced the direction of the policy pro-
cess. The Liberal Government effectively imported its
policy positions from the WTO negotiations, many of
which developing countries and civil society protested at
the time. In the Canadian context, the result was a legisla-
tion that largely favoured protecting intellectual property
and a more limited interpretation of TRIPS when it comes
to permitting patent flexibilities.
Of further importance is the private and non-transpar-
ent process by which the first draft of the legislation got
designed - private consultations that occurred prior to
the public hearings. The only participants in these private
consultations were representatives of the research-based
industry, the generic industry and civil society. As How-
lett describes, this process itself is quite common as it
allows for the Government to control the scope of the
policy debate;[36] however, it was during this stage that
the legislation became quickly grounded in a more
restricted interpretation of TRIPS, having reintroduced
limitations on the scope of medicines and countries, as
well as outlining specific restrictions on the nature of
compulsory license under the regime. The public debates
that permitted closer scrutiny, were conflicts over what
was already a very narrow range of alternatives to choose
from.
The most significant factor in the outcome of the 2007
debates appears to be the preference of the Conservative
Government to maintain the status quo and leave CAMR
unchanged. The Conservative government had little
incentive to improve the legislation since it was a Liberal
initiative. Moreover, under their new leadership, Canada’s
foreign policy took on a more aggressive approach with
respect to intellectual property protection.
r For example,
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade (DFAIT) announced in 2007 that it was assessing
its interests in protecting intellectual property as it
initiated trade agreements in Peru, Colombia and the
Dominican Republic.
s The Government’ss t a t e di n t e n t
was to protect the interests of Canadian firms and intel-
lectual property owners in foreign markets given the
increased importance of intellectual property in Canada’s
knowledge-based economy. This new policy position
made the prospects for any amendments to the regime
unlikely from the start.
The qualitative contents of the policy debates in 2007
showed a much larger range of issues up for discussion
when compared with 2004. Debates focused largely on
the efficiency of CAMR, identifying intellectual property
protection and upstream implementation issues as
impeding the participation of both the generic industry
and developing country governments. The framing dif-
ferences observed may partly be explained by the nature
of the policy process: the focus on one issue naturally
comes at the expense of another [40]. It appears as
though in 2004, civil society and the generic industry’s
focus on the right of refusal, the lists of medicines, the
list of countries and allowing NGOs to be eligible pur-
chasers under the regime, came at a cost of lobbying for
other changes to the legislation.
One barrier received significant attention in the 2007
debates but failed to resonate when briefly mentioned in
2004. Developing country pressure was mentioned by
civil society in 2004 but it was not discussed by any other
stakeholder or politician until 2007, when most stake-
holders and politicians acknowledged that country notifi-
cation was a major impediment to CAMR’s success.
Neither civil society nor the generic industry was con-
cerned with country notification, profit limits and delays
in voluntary license negotiations in the 2004. Their
silence was likely because the policy alternatives they
were facing were much worse; however, that these issues
are rooted in the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision itself leads
to the obvious question of why civil society and the
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Paragraph 6 Decision in Canada, despite their opinion
that the Decision was flawed [41]. It is possible that
they have an incremental policy approach in mind, as
they are now calling on more fundamental changes to
CAMR and the WTO system in general [36]. Most
recently, Canadian civil society led a new campaign to
introduce legislation to amend CAMR to facilitate a
streamlined, “one-license solution” [42]. While the
Canadian Parliament passed this solution under Bill C-
3 9 3 ,i tw a st h e nb l o c k e dt h eC o n s e r v a t i v em a j o r i t yi n
the Canadian Senate. Given the new Conservative
majority government recently elected in Canada, future
reform of CAMR seems highly unlikely.
The framing differences observed between 2007 and
2004 can also be partly attributed to a greater represen-
tation of the interests of developing country govern-
m e n t s .W h i l et h er a n g eo fs t a k e h o l d e r si n v o l v e di nt h e
2007 legislative review remained similar to 2004, civil
society, the generic industry, government civil servants
and even the research-based industry, had more interac-
tion with beneficiary country representatives which was
specific to CAMR, yielding new and more relevant
information. Hence, a much larger range of issues came
to the fore. Had representatives of developing country
governments been more involved during the 2004 con-
sultations, it is possible that these issues may have
become more prominently discussed or considered.
Both sets of debates saw a number of issues pertinent
to drug access not raised, or if they were, they were not
taken up by the political system. These under-repre-
sented themes included innovation, the domestic econ-
omy and human rights. The silence on these issues
speaks to a larger question of the assumptions underlying
policy debates on access to medicines and intellectual
property and policy alternatives that were not explored.
Focusing on human rights in particular, it appears as
though both civil society and the Liberal Government
mentioned the issue of human rights but it did not have
much resonance within the political system. Civil
society’s silence on the issue of human rights was likely
a strategic decision to frame their discourse to suit the
Standing Committee’sn e e d s .
t Perhaps more striking is
the contrast between the Liberal and Conservative Gov-
ernment’s discourse on human rights, which appear to
be rooted in a very different conception of the realiza-
tion of the right to health. The Liberal government
framed CAMR early on as a tool to pursue human
rights and a Liberal MP further suggested that Canada’s
responsibility includes running projects to help imple-
ment CAMR in other countries [43,44]
u.T h e s eg o a l s
d i dn o tg e ti n c o r p o r a t e di n t ot h ef i n a lp o l i c yd e s i g n .I n
contrast, the Conservative Government did not view
their responsibilities as extending to the promotion of
the right to health for those in other countries.
v Under-
lying these contrasting views leads to a much broader
question, which is: what are states’ obligations to ensur-
ing access to medicines in other countries and how does
this relate to the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision.
From the perspective of the public policy process, the
case study and analysis presented in this study shows that
framing can obscure the real trade-offs in a policy debates.
For the research-based industry and its supporters, com-
pulsory licensing is framed as breaking patents, theft and
piracy. Throughout policy debates in many areas, social
conservatives’ arguments against government intervention
share a similar connotation: government intervention is
labelled as impinging on individual liberty and as inher-
ently inefficient [13]. This widely held idea prevents many
innovative policy balances from being achieved. Evidence
suggests that the use of compulsory licensing in countries
where there is negligible pharmaceutical purchasing power
will not be detrimental to pharmaceutical innovation [45].
But those strongly opposed to the use of compulsory
licensing in developing countries appear to be more con-
cerned about a slippery slope; a fear that compulsory
l i c e n s i n gw o u l db e c o m eam o r ew i d e l yu s e dp o l i c yt o o l
and eventually cut into the markets and R&D budgets of
the research-based industry. As a consequence, the gra-
dual decline of compulsory licensing as a legitimate policy
tool to address drug access removes one more policy tool
from governments’ arsenals to address the problem of
high drug costs. At the time of writing, Canada remains
the only country to have successfully exported medicines
under the WTO Paragraph 6 mechanism and the HIV/
AIDS medicines order to Rwanda remains the only
instance where CAMR has been used.
Global drug policy developments: does Paragraph 6 still
matter?
From a larger global drug policy perspective, there has
been a large increase in international efforts aimed at
improving drug access, including the growth of the Glo-
bal Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(GFATM), UNITAID and the Clinton Health Access
Initiative (CHAI). Since the Global Fund was established
in 2002, it has put 3 million people on antiretroviral
therapy worldwide.
w UNITAID, an international finan-
cing facility started by Brazil, Chile, France, Norway and
the United Kingdom in 2006, has raised as much as US
$1.3 billion mainly through airline levies and contribu-
t i o n sf r o mt h eG a t e sF o u n d a t i o n .
x By providing the
financing necessary and collaborating with the Clinton
Health Access Initiative’s “forward pricing” mechanisms,
UNITAID helped bring the price of paediatric medicines
down by 64% and tenofovir by more than 70%.
y
The Medicines Patent Pool, which transitioned out of
UNITAID in November 2010, involves cooperation with
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sing for certain drugs (ARVs).
z In September 2010, it
secured its first license from the US National Institutes
of Health, which covers a series of patents related to
darunavir.
aa In 2011, Gilead reached an agreement,
which allows for the production of tenofovir, emtricita-
bine, cobicistat, and elvitegravir as well as a combination
of these products.
ab However, the success of the patent
pool rests solely on companies’ willingness to donate
their patents voluntarily on a case by case. Most
recently, Johnson and Johnson refused to donate its
patents on rilpivirine, darunavir, and etravirine.
ac Com-
panies appear to be more interested in older ARVs and
they are asking for market segmentation - middle-
income countries like Brazil, India, South Africa and
China may be prevented from either benefiting or parti-
cipating in the patent pool.
ad
Despite these developments in drug affordability and
access, current options for second and third line antire-
trovirals are still limited. Orsi and d’Almeida report that
although first-line therapy has benefited from market
competition, second and third line antiretroviral drugs
run significantly higher at rates such as US$ 610 and
1660 per patient per year [46]. Prices in middle-income
countries can run significantly two to three times higher
[46]. It is from this perspective that global civil society
activists still promote a role for compulsory licensing
and the Paragraph 6 Decision, as a stick that country
governments could use, to either speed up the process
of obtaining these price reductions in needed areas of
treatment, or to address those medicines where patent-
holders are not willing to cooperate. Some developing
countries, including India, argue that the Canadian
experience shows that the Decision is not working [47]
ae. Clearly, some developing countries still believe that
Paragraph 6 matters but CAMR’s potential role in
improving global drug access is still unclear. There may
be potential for Canada to take advantage of its sophisti-
cated manufacturing capacity through the production
and export of active pharmaceutical ingredients or other
expensive and difficult to produce products.
af Given
Canada’s sophisticated generic manufacturing capacity,
CAMR may be able to serve a specialized role but the
overall magnitude of CAMR’s contribution to improving
global drug access will likely be small.
Limitations
There are limitations in our research. First, within the
r a n g eo fp o l i c i e st h a te x i s tt oa d d r e s sa c c e s st om e d i -
cines, the case of CAMR is a narrow and specific one. A
broader case study could provide more information on
the range of possible policy alternatives that are avail-
able to pursue drug access and to better assess how
institutions and interests favour some policy alternatives
over others. This case was chosen, however, due to its
urgency as a policy dilemma and as a critical global
drug policy question: what political factors influence
policies that aim to reduce drug prices through the use
of patent flexibilities? Furthermore, given CAMR’s rele-
vance to the global Paragraph 6 debate–Canada remains
the only country to have produced and exported under
the Paragraph 6 mechanism–the findings from this
research have global drug policy significance. Specifi-
cally, CAMR has important lessons to pass on to civil
society advocates and policy-makers worldwide about
the conditions under which such flexibilities may or
may not be politically feasible. The findings from this
study can inform advocates’ and policy-makers’ framing
strategies, their use of institutions and scope of conflict,
to inform future policy initiatives in this area.
The mixed method content analysis technique imposed
its own limitations on the research but these limits are
highly related to the heterogeneity of the literature in
which this study is based. This thesis research appears to
be the only rigorous, comprehensive analysis of policy
contents in the area of drug access and intellectual prop-
erty. The use of a codebook in this study was required to
ensure reliability and validity of the findings. That said, the
codebook is unique therefore the transferability of the
quantitative content analysis results are limited to the
themes searched for. However, the qualitative summaries
of the themes provide sufficient information to the reader
who may be seek a different perspective on how stake-
holders framed the issues.
Lastly, the content analysis was limited to the standing
committee hearing transcripts. These data boundaries
were drawn in relation to ensuring a representative cross-
section of the debates were used and also out of respect of
the resource and time limitations of the research itself. Of
course, a wider swath of data over a larger period of time
likely would have covered more themes and more actors.
Nevertheless, the case boundaries were defined much
more broadly, with the literature review covering docu-
ments prior to the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision and up
until the 2007 debates. Furthermore, this study included
discussion of issues up until mid-2011 in relation to the
developments around CAMR, Paragraph 6, and develop-
ments globally on drug access. This context helped trian-
gulate the findings of the content analysis and provided
additional data to ensure a complete picture of CAMR’s
political development was presented.
Conclusions
The Canadian government tried to balance between
drug affordability and intellectual property protection
b u ti td e s i g n e dC A M Ra sal a s tr e s o r tm e a s u r e .
Increased input from the developing country benefici-
aries and shifting to institutions where the right to
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achieves affordable drug access.
Endnotes
aThe Global Fund has placed more than 3 million
people on antiretroviral therapy since 2002 and the
Gates Foundation, who has donated more than US$2.2
billion in HIV grants to organizations around the world.
From: Overview: The Gates Foundation’sH I VS t r a t e g y ,
July 2010. http://www.gatesfoundation.org/hivaids/Docu-
ments/hiv-strategy-overview.pdf [Date Accessed: 26 June
2011].
bUNAIDS estimates that approximately 170,000 peo-
ple were living with HIV in Rwanda in 2009. UNAIDS:
Rwanda. Available at: http://www.unaids.org/en/region-
scountries/countries/rwanda/ [Date accessed: 22 January
2012].
cObviously, numerous other values can be and are a
part of policy debates; however, these four ideas are use-
ful for understanding the trade-offs that governments
face between policy goals.
dProvisions also exist to prevent or remedy anti-com-
petitive practice (Articles 8.2, 31(k) and 40). Article 30
permits an early working provision, which allows generic
companies to obtain product approval and enter the
market immediately upon patent expiration.
eLexchin, J. Brief to the Industry, Science and Tech-
nology Committee on Bill C-9, An Act to Amend the
Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act. February 23,
2004.
fThe research-based pharmaceutical industry is gener-
ally opposed to the routine use of compulsory licensing
based upon its potential for several harmful effects,
arguing that compulsory licensing: 1) reduces prospects
for economic growth in developing countries that adopt
it; 2) kills the incentives for pharmaceutical firms to
innovate and to introduce new products into the coun-
try; 3) encourages free-riding by imitator firms and
denies local firms the opportunity to participate in tech-
nology transfer in these countries; and 4) generally
demonstrates “a lack of respect for intellectual property
rights,”. [Rozek RP. The effects of compulsory licensing
on innovation and access to health care. The Journal of
World Intellectual Property. 2000;3(6):889-917]. Given
these potential consequences, the research-based indus-
try and its supporters oppose “broad-based compulsory
licensing” arguing that compulsory licensing, as stipu-
lated by Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, is intended
to be of limited use, mainly to address anti-trust issues.
Historically, compulsory licenses have been more fre-
quently granted as judicial remedies for violation of
competition laws. See: “Examples of Health-related
Compulsory Licenses” at: http://www.cptech.org/ip/
health/cl/recent-examples.html
gCompulsory licensing to manufacture was a part of
the Patent Act since 1923.
hThe legislative initiative was first tabled in Parliament
as Bill C-56 and then reintroduced in the following ses-
sion as Bill C-9.
iBill C-56, An Act to amend the Patent Act and the
Food and Drugs Act, 2nd Sess., 36
th Parl., 2003 (1
st
reading 6 November 2003). The legislation was passed
as the “Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa Act”,a n dw a s
subsequently renamed by the new Conservative Govern-
ment, “Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime.”
jThe information includes: “t h en a m eo ft h el i c e n s e d
product, as set out in Schedule 1, and, if applicable, the
strength, dosage form and route of administration; its dis-
tinguishing characteristics; the identity of the importing
country; the amount to be manufactured and sold for
export; information identifying every known party who
will be handling the product while it is in transit from
Canada to the importing country; and the export tracking
number and number of the bill of lading for each
shipment.”
kThis is referred to as the “Good Faith Clause”. Patent
holders can challenge a compulsory licence if they can
prove that “the average price of the licensed drug or
medical device is 25 percent or more of the average
price of the equivalent patented product in Canada. The
licence holder has an absolute defence if the licence
holder can establish that the average price of the drug
or medical device remains less than its direct supply
cost, plus 15 percent.”
lAdditional grounds under which a patent-holder can
challenge the license include: if any information in the
application is inaccurate; if the license holder fails to
meet the conditions of the license including: “establishing
and maintaining a website; providing for all shipments an
export notice to the patent holder, the importing country
and the purchaser; paying the prescribed royalty to the
patent holder; or, providing the patent holder and the
Commissioner of Patents with a copy of any supply
agreement related to the licence."; if the exported product
exceeded the specified quantity; “if the product was used
by a non-WTO member country for commercial pur-
poses; or if the country failed to adopt anti-diversion
measures as specified by Article 4 of the Decision.”
mSee: QSR International, Available at: http://www.
qsrinternational.com
nThe chair only votes unless there is a tie. http://
www2.parl.gc.ca/CommitteeBusiness/CommitteeMem-
bership.aspx?Cmte=INST&Language=E&Mode=1&-
Parl=37&Ses=3 [accessed: 6 September 2009]
oThe research-based industry was represented by the
President of Canada’s Research-Based Pharmaceutical
Companies (Rx&D), and one representative of Eli Lilly
and Company. The Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical
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Page 12 of 14Association was represented by its President, and one
industry executive from Novopharm Limited.
pThe barriers to CAMR’s success are largely depen-
dent upon whose perspective is assumed, which is one
of the findings of this study. For the purposes of this
paper, I have used civil society and the generic indus-
try’s concerns as a reference point for the barriers to
CAMR’s use based upon the premise that they are the
key stakeholders in the implementation of the regime.
These barriers were based on their positions during the
2007 hearings, and triangulated by information from
their 2007 consultation submissions and the Standing
Committee’s final report to the Government.
qOther barriers that civil society and the generic industry
identified but will be discussed later include delays asso-
ciated with voluntary license negotiations, restrictions on
the duration, quantity and number of countries per com-
pulsory license, and perhaps most importantly, the
requirements of the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision itself.
rLetter from Richard Elliott (Canadian HIV/AIDS
Legal Network) to Lesia Stangret, Assistant Deputy
Director, Intellectual Property, Information and Tech-
nology Trade Policy Division, Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade, Re: Intellectual Property
issues in bilateral free trade agreements. July 17, 2007.
s“Subjects For Closed Consultations: Intellectual Prop-
erty. The Government of Canada is seeking the Views of
Canadians to Assess Canadian Intellectual Property Inter-
ests in Selected Markets”. Date accessed: 12 March 2010.
From: From: http://www.international.gc.ca/consultations/
closed-anterieures2.aspx?lang=en
tFor example, an entire section of the Canadian HIV/
AIDS Legal Network’s written submission to the Stand-
ing Committee framed a less restrictive interpretation of
the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision in terms of Canada’s
international human rights obligations.
uThe Government’s initial discourse in the media
framed CAMR as a tool to achieve human rights: “The
current initiative sets a unique global standard on the
frontiers of public health and human rights."(See Graham,
2003)
vThe Conservative Government stated, “...While that
covenant [the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights] requires each state party to
promote the right to health for its own citizens, there is
no interstate obligation to protect the right in other
countries, and while all international development assis-
tance, including health-related assistance, is a moral and
not a legal obligation, Canada has been a major donor
to health-related initiatives in the developing world.”
wThe Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria. “Fighting AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.”
Available at: <http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/
diseases/> [Date Accessed: 26 June 2011].
xSee UNITAID webpage. Available at: http://www.uni-
taid.eu/who/background?id=159 [Accessed 10 July
2010].
y“How UNITAID Works in Markets”. May 2011. Avail-
able at: http://www.unitaid.eu/images/Factsheets/md_fact-
sheet_2011_en.pdf [Date Accessed: 26 June 2011].
zMedicines Patent Pool. Home Page. Available at:
<http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/> [Date accessed:
26 June 2011]
aaMedicines Patent Pool. “Current Licenses”.A v a i l a b l e
at: http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/LICENSING/
Current-Licences [Date accessed: 26 June 2011].
abMedicines Patent Pool. “Medicines Patent Pool Signs
Licences to Increase Access to HIV/AIDS Medicines.”
Press release. 12 July 2011. Available at: http://www.
medicinespatentpool.org/medicines-patent-pool-
announces-first-licensing-agreement-with-a-pharmaceu-
tical-company/ [Date accessed 23 January 2012].
acMSF Access to Medicines Campaign. 2011. “Johnson
& Johnson Turns Its Back on AIDS Patients.” 25 April
2011. Available at: <http://www.msfaccess.org/about-us/
media-room/press-releases/johnson-johnson-turns-its-
back-aids-patients> [Date accessed: 26 June 2011].
adSee” Make It Happen”, MSF Campaign for Access to
Essential Medicines, November 30, 2009. Available at:
http://www.msfaccess.org/make-it-happen [Accessed 10
July 2010].
aeSee also, “M e m b e r sa s k :i st h e“Par.6” system on
intellectual property and health working?” WTO web-
page, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news10_e/trip_02mar10_e.htm [Accessed 10 July 2010].
afAs argued by civil society representatives at the 2007
debates. See: Canada. Parliament. House of Commons.
Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technol-
ogy. Evidence. (April 16, 2007) 39th Parliament, 1st
Session.
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